

## **CHINA'S STRATEGIC CULTURE: A PERSPECTIVE FOR THE UNITED STATES**

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**June 2009**

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ISBN 1-58487-393-0

## PREFACE

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A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Antulio J. Ecchevarria II".

ANTULIO J. ECHEVARRIA II  
Director of Research  
Strategic Studies Institute

## **ABOUT THE AUTHOR**

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## **ABSTRACT**

For the past 2 decades, the People's Republic of China (PRC) has made great gains in national development and economic growth and now stands as one of the most important states on the world scene. It is extremely important for U.S. policymakers to have a contextual understanding of what shapes Chinese thought and behavior thus driving Chinese political, economic, and military imperatives. With much of the American public accepting the "China Threat" theory, it is critical that the United States recognize the role of strategic culture in shaping China's domestic and external policies. This paper illustrates the key characteristics of Chinese strategic culture—philosophy, history, and domestic factors that, to a remarkable extent, structure the strategic objectives of China's formal foreign policy and explain how Chinese strategic interests are defined by modern Chinese pragmatic nationalism, its drive for modernization, and the desire for China to have a more prominent role in the Asian and world communities. A concluding analysis of the implications of Chinese strategic culture offer recommendations for U.S. national security policy.



## CHINA'S STRATEGIC CULTURE: A PERSPECTIVE FOR THE UNITED STATES

China . . . has long pledged not to seek hegemony, not to join any military bloc, and not to pursue its own spheres of influence.

Chinese Vice President Hu Jintao<sup>1</sup>

In the past 30 years, the People's Republic of China (PRC) has experienced rapid growth and change. The current China bears very little resemblance to the old China of the Cold War. For the past 2 decades, China has made great gains in national development and economic growth and now stands not just as a regional power, but as one of the most important states on the world scene. The emergence of China—politically, militarily, and economically—is fundamentally changing the status quo in the Pacific Rim. Moreover, with China increasingly able to assert its influence as a growing world power and with its growing potential as a peer competitor, the United States must decide how to define its relationship to China in the coming key decade. While developing any strategy dealing with China, U.S. policymakers must have a contextual understanding of what shapes Chinese thought and behavior, above and beyond the waning Communist ideology, and thus drives Chinese political, economic, and military imperatives. Yet historically, the United States has displayed a poor record of fully appreciating the cultural imperatives that are behind Chinese decisionmaking. This paper will help provide that context by identifying the key characteristics of Chinese strategic culture—philosophy, history, and domestic factors that to a remarkable extent structure the strategic objectives of China's formal foreign policy. These factors explain how Chinese strategic interests are defined by China's defensive psychology, its pragmatic nationalism, and its drive for economic development and modernization to allow China a more prominent role in the Asian and world communities. A concluding analysis of the implications of Chinese strategic culture offer recommendations for U.S. national security policy.

### **China's Strategic Culture: Why the United States Needs to Understand It.**

The ascendancy of China as a great power can be considered one of the most important developments in the post-Cold War world.<sup>2</sup> Over the past decade, China watchers have noted, some with relative alarm, the rapid economic growth and growing power of China. With many analysts quick to point out China's high level of defense spending, U.S. policymakers continue to grapple with the potential challenge of an increasingly strong and assertive China to the Asia-Pacific region and to the world in general.

By citing China's rapid economic growth, military modernization, and in recent years a surge in energy demand, a growing U.S. segment now talks about a "China Threat" and debates possible strategies for "containing" China in the coming years.<sup>3</sup> Mistrust and suspicion of China's motivation and intentions have prompted extreme viewpoints by some observers, such as Bill Gertz in his analysis that:

The People's Republic of China is the most serious national security threat the United States faces at present and will remain so into the foreseeable future. . . . The reason Americans should take the threat from China so seriously is that it puts at risk the very national existence of the United States.<sup>4</sup>

Uncertainty and anxiousness concerning China's rise have led the American public to accept the "China Threat" theory, with 31 percent of the population in 2005 subscribing to the belief that "China will soon dominate the world" and 54 percent believing that "the emergence of China as a superpower is a threat to world peace."<sup>5</sup> The second Bush administration took a more constructive approach during its two terms, promoting policies to integrate China into the international economic and political system. Nevertheless, the 2006 *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* assessed that "China has the greatest potential to compete militarily with the United States and field disruptive military technologies that could over time offset traditional U.S. military advantages."<sup>6</sup> This was followed by the Department of Defense's (DoD) 2008 *Annual Report on Military Power of the People's Republic of China* that informed Congress:

The pace and scope of China's military transformation have increased in recent years, fueled by acquisition of advanced foreign weapons, continued high rates of investment in its domestic defense and science and technology industries, and far reaching organizational and doctrinal reforms of the armed forces. China's expanding and improving military capabilities are changing East Asian military balances; improvements in China's strategic capabilities have implications beyond the Asia-Pacific region.<sup>7</sup>

The concern with China continues to find its expression in the Obama administration. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates addressed the "China threat" in his January 2009 speech to the Senate Armed Services Committee:

China is modernizing across the whole of its armed forces. The areas of greatest concern are Chinese investments and growing capabilities in cyber- and anti-satellite warfare, anti-air and anti-ship weaponry, submarines, and ballistic missiles. Modernization in these areas could threaten America's primary means of projecting power and helping allies in the Pacific: our bases, air, and sea assets, and the networks that support them.<sup>8</sup>

The rise of a great power by nature changes the balance of power in the international system. It also poses great challenges to the dominant great power in the system, which, at this historical moment, is the United States. However, many of the challenges may not turn into actual threats to the United States. With such ominous conclusions concerning China's threat increasingly taken *prima facie*, it can be assessed that very often China's foreign policies are vastly misunderstood by the United States. Misunderstanding and distrust have great consequence in foreign policy. As China continues its rise, it is critical for U.S. policymakers to understand how China's strategic culture defines the way China sees the world—and why China behaves as it does on the world's stage.

### **Chinese Traditional Culture: The Influence of Confucian Thought.**

The culture of China is one of the world's oldest and most complex cultures. Chinese history, as documented in ancient writings, dates back some 3,300 years. Modern

archeological studies provide evidence of still more ancient origins in a culture that flourished between 2500 and 2000 B.C. in what is now Central China and the lower Huang He (Yellow River) Valley on north China. Centuries of migration, amalgamation, and development brought about a distinctive system of writing, philosophy, art, music, and political organization that came to be recognizable as Chinese civilization. What makes the civilization unique in world history is its continuity over 4,000 years to the present.<sup>9</sup>

Contemporary Chinese culture consists of three major elements – traditional culture, Communist ideology, and, more recently, Western values. Traditional Chinese social values are derived from Confucianism, Taoism, and to a lesser degree, Buddhism. Confucianism is undisputedly the most influential thought that forms the foundation of Chinese cultural tradition and still provides the basis for the norms of Chinese interpersonal behavior.<sup>10</sup> Confucianism is the behavioral or moral doctrine that is based on the teachings of Confucius regarding human relationships, social structures, virtuous behavior, and work ethic. In Confucianism, rules are spelled out for the social behavior of every individual, governing the entire range of human interaction in society. The basic teaching of Confucius is distilled in the Five Constant Virtues: humanity, righteousness, propriety, wisdom, and faithfulness.<sup>11</sup>

Chinese philosophical thinking has deep cultural and historical roots impacting Chinese strategic behavior. Confucianism provides many of the essential elements in Chinese military thought and Chinese conduct of international relations. It has dominated the thinking and administration since the Han Dynasty (206 BC-220 AD). Confucianism favors harmony over conflict and defense over offense. Even the writings of the Chinese military strategist Sun Tzu had a strong Confucian philosophical underpinning.<sup>12</sup> Sun Tzu stated that the preferred strategic goal is to win a war without resorting to the use of force.<sup>13</sup> The highest tactic to defeat an adversary is not to use force but to win through nonviolent or nonmilitary actions. Indeed, one of the basic tenets of Confucianism is that “peace is precious” (*he wei gui*). Chinese researchers have traced this preference for peace and harmony back throughout Chinese history and stress that China pursues peaceful solutions rather than violent ones.<sup>14</sup> As noted by Li Jijun, former Deputy Director of the Chinese Academy of Military Sciences, “China’s ancient strategic culture is rooted in the philosophical idea of ‘unity between man and nature’ (*tian ren he yi*), which pursues overall harmony between man and nature and harmony among men.”<sup>15</sup>

Since the formation of the PRC, its leaders have consistently contended that socialist China places a great value on peace and cooperation. This is clearly articulated in *China’s National Defense White Paper for 2006*:

To uphold world peace, promote common development and seek cooperation and win-win is the common wish of the people around the world and an irresistible trend of our times. Committed to peace, development and cooperation, China pursues a road of peaceful development, and endeavors to build, together with other countries, a harmonious world of enduring peace and common prosperity. Never before has China been so closely bound up with the rest of the world as it is today. The Chinese government works to advance both the fundamental interests of the Chinese people and the common interests of the peoples of the rest of the world, and pursues a defense policy which is purely defensive in nature. China is determined to remain a staunch force for global peace, security and stability.<sup>16</sup>

Professor Huiyun Feng of Utah State University, who has written extensively on Chinese foreign policy and leadership decisionmaking, notes the critical role of Confucian thought evident in Chinese strategic culture in her 2007 work, *Chinese Strategic Culture and Foreign Policy Decisionmaking: Confucianism, Leadership, and War*. Feng examined the decisionmaking of six key Chinese leaders in three major wars—the Korean War (1950-53), the Sino-Indian War (1962), and the Sino-Vietnamese War (1979)—and concluded that they followed Confucian beliefs and norms in strategic decisionmaking and behavior, therefore demonstrating a *defensive* strategic culture vice an offensive one.<sup>17</sup> Feng's study is intriguing as it appears to support the view that a Chinese defensive strategic culture exists despite a communist revolutionary regime that presumably should have pursued the spread of world revolution. Feng's study challenges the "China threat" theory that in terms of traditional realist theory defines China as a revisionist power eager to address wrongs done to it in history. It further questions other cultural and historical analysis attesting that China's strategic culture has been offensive despite its weak material capability.<sup>18</sup>

Confucian thought has much influence on China's nonexpansionist and defensive-oriented strategic culture. However, Chinese history has also played a critical role in this development. Key historical events, particularly during the 19th and 20th centuries, left lasting impressions on the Chinese people, and continue to define China's modern strategic culture.

### **Foreign Intervention and War: Suspicion of Outside Powers.**

As noted, Confucian ideas of the state have played a large role in Chinese strategic culture. Another potent aspect of this culture is modern Chinese nationalism that arose only after China was brought into the modern nation-state system in the 19th century.<sup>19</sup> The catalyst for this development was the national crisis caused by China's defeat by the British in the 1840-42 Opium War. This situation led to the disintegration of imperial China and the loss of national sovereignty as Western powers carved out zones of extraterritoriality and influence on the mainland. Most devastating was China's defeat by Japan during the 1894-95 Sino-Japanese War. This war effectively awoke the Chinese people "from the dream of 4,000 years."<sup>20</sup>

By the late 19th century, resentment towards foreigners in China was on the rise and ultimately developed into the Boxer Uprising of 1900. The Boxers were a violent anti-foreign, anti-Christian movement formed in response to perceived imperialist expansion and the spread of western influences in China. To protect their missionaries, diplomats, and perhaps to a larger degree their trade interests, an "Eight Nation Alliance" consisting of Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States invaded China in August 1900. The Allied armies eventually reached Peking which was under siege. Following the taking of the capital, troops from the international force, except for the British and the Americans, looted the city and ransacked the imperial Forbidden City, with the accumulated riches of a dynasty finding their way back to Europe.<sup>21</sup>

Rape, robbery, and mayhem went on around the clock. Chinese suspected of having been Boxers or having sympathized with the movement were tortured and killed. Even Chinese innocent of any involvement in the uprising were stripped of their possessions, saw their daughters raped, watched their shops looted, and their homes burned. An uncontrollable, blood-lusting madness seemed to have seized the occupation forces from many lands.<sup>22</sup> Thousands of citizens died during the campaign, and the violence that the Alliance caused in committing acts of looting, murder, and rape have been long remembered by the Chinese.<sup>23</sup>

Subsequently, the imperial government was forced to sign the unequal Boxer Protocol of 1901, which further violated China's national rights with a protocol that interfered with China's internal administration and also her national defenses. In general, Chinese society suffered, and discontent rose when the Qing government raised taxes to pay for the heavy indemnity the treaty imposed.<sup>24</sup>

This discontent eventually led to the Revolution of 1911 and the end of Chinese Imperial rule. With the central government still in turmoil, China was further insulted when the Allied Powers included Article 156 in the 1919 Treaty of Versailles that transferred German concessions in Shandong, China, to Japan rather than restoring them to China. Chinese outrage over this provision led to student demonstrations and the resulting May Fourth Movement (1919), an anti-imperialist, cultural and political movement, which eventually influenced China not to sign the treaty. The May Fourth movement covered more than 20 provinces and over 100 cities in China, and had a broader popular foundation than the revolution of 1911. It promoted the spread of Marxism in China, and prepared the ideological foundation for the establishment of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).<sup>25</sup> Western-style liberal democracy, which previously had a degree of traction among Chinese intellectuals, lost its attractiveness after Versailles (seen as a betrayal of China's interests by the West). Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points, cloaked as they were by moralism, were also seen as Western-centric and hypocritical.<sup>26</sup>

In the 1920s and 1930s, civil war between the Nationalist Party (Kuomintang or KMT) and the CCP ensued. However, China once again would become the brutal victim of foreign interests, perhaps the worst it endured to date, beginning with the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931 and culminating with the Second Sino-Japanese War from 1937 to 1945. China suffered dearly during the 14 years of Japanese aggression. The 1938-39 "Rape of Nanking" alone cost the Chinese approximately 200,000 to 300,000 civilian casualties at the hands of the Japanese Imperial Army.<sup>27</sup> It is estimated that overall and quite aside from those killed in battle, the Japanese probably murdered 3,949,000 Chinese during the war, even possibly as many as 6,325,000.<sup>28</sup> The Japanese invasion during this period threatened the very survival of the Chinese nation and gave rise to a nationalist mass mobilization movement that eventually led to CCP victory.

When the PRC was established in October 1949, Mao Zedong had planned that the United States would be the first country with which to establish foreign relations.<sup>29</sup> Instead, the newly established PRC found itself shunned by the United States and Western democracies that had supported the Nationalists. With the Cold War against the Soviet Union already in full swing, the Truman administration made it clear it would not recognize the Chinese communists.<sup>30</sup> Due to the apparently incorrect choice made by

the U.S. Government, the CCP and the Chinese people led by Mao were pushed into an anti-American position.<sup>31</sup> Even soon afterward, as war broke out in Korea (1950-53), Mao and other leaders of the CCP did not immediately propose to “resist America and assist Korea,” or at least did not want direct military involvement.<sup>32</sup> However, once United Nations (UN) forces crossed the 38th parallel and started pushing the North Korean army towards the Yalu River and the Chinese border, Chinese leaders reluctantly made the decision to dispatch troops to Korea.<sup>33</sup> China’s subsequent intervention in the Korean War was primarily precipitated by its historical mistrust of intervening foreign powers and concerns for its own security.<sup>34</sup> The Chief of Staff of the Chinese Army, in a private conversation with a Dutch diplomat in Beijing, stated that China had “no choice but fight,” if the 38th parallel was crossed; and although war with the United States might set back China’s development 50 years, if China did not resist, it would “forever be under American control.”<sup>35</sup> The PRC leadership believed that if China did not take the initiative, then U.S. forces would press on China along the Yalu River, China’s northeastern defense force would be pinned down, Southern Manchuria’s power supply (generated from hydroelectric plants in North Korea) would be controlled by hostile forces, and the entire situation would destabilize the PRC while it was still in its infancy.<sup>36</sup> Thus, in China’s view, it entered the war in “self-defense,” with the objective of keeping the “invading” American forces away from the Yalu River to ensure a peaceful environment in which China could proceed with its internal reconstruction. By fighting in North Korea, the “Chinese People’s Volunteer Army” (CPVA) fought to defend their own homes and country for the next 3 years, at the cost of a huge drain on China’s national strength.<sup>37</sup> In doing so, China suffered more than 390,000 dead and wounded.<sup>38</sup> Ironically, by going to war in Korea, the Chinese demonstrated the defensive nature of their strategic culture.

The crucial national narrative of the “Century of Humiliation” at the hands of imperialist and hegemonic powers is central to Chinese nationalism today.<sup>39</sup> The weight of the past, it seems, is particularly heavy in China—it is evident that these historical events drastically shaped the strategic culture of the Chinese people. As General Li Jijun of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) said in an address at the U.S Army War College in 1997:

Before 1949, when the People’s Republic of China was established, more than 1000 treaties and agreements, most of which were unequal in their terms, were forced upon China by the Western powers. As many as 1.8 million square kilometers were also taken away from Chinese territory. This was a period of humiliation that the Chinese can never forget. This is why the people of China show such strong emotions in matters concerning our national independence, unity, integrity of territory and sovereignty. This is also why the Chinese are so determined to safeguard them under any circumstances and at all costs.<sup>40</sup>

Chinese suspicion of foreign intentions becomes easy to understand and to place in context. Even after its immediate establishment, the fledgling PRC was faced with isolation and containment by the world community, along with uncertain intentions by U.S. military forces along its borders in Korea, and later Vietnam. Ironically, the PRC itself was the product of a movement with strong nationalist credentials; it was hardly distinctively communist in its early years. Today, Chinese nationalism in its basic form encompasses the pride of being Chinese, the collective memory of the humiliations of the past, and the

aspiration for a return to greatness. China's rise as an economic, political, and military power has been accompanied by an outburst of nationalism among its population. While there is debate whether this current nationalism makes China less peaceful, the PRC's foreign policy thus far has demonstrated it practices a "pragmatic" nationalism tempered by diplomatic prudence, and its leaders have set peace and economic development as China's primary international goals while seeking to avoid confrontations with the United States and other Western powers that hold the key to China's modernization.<sup>41</sup>

### **Chinese Pragmatic Nationalism: What it Means.**

The surge of Chinese nationalism in the post-Cold War era is neither novel nor surprising from a historical perspective. As previously noted, the historical defeats and the subsequent humiliation at the hands of imperialist powers were the impetus for the rise of Chinese nationalism. However, the type of modern Chinese nationalism, with its perceived grievances or approach to national revitalization, has many forms. Therefore, it is important that U.S. policymakers understand the flavor of nationalism in play today, and how it actually works in the U.S.'s favor.

Professor Suisheng Zhao defines three dimensions of Chinese nationalism: Nativism, Antitraditionalism, and Pragmatism.<sup>42</sup> "Nativism" is a confrontational orientation and identifies the sources of China's weakness as foreign imperialism and subversion of indigenous Chinese virtues, and sees the best approach to national revitalization as a return to Confucian tradition and self-reliance. "Antitraditionalism" seeks accommodation, and, while believing Chinese tradition and culture itself is the source of China's weakness, advocates the adoption of certain foreign cultures and models of modernization as the key. Lastly, "pragmatism" is adaptive in nature, and, while understanding that the source of China's weakness is the lack of modernization and particularly economic backwardness, it believes that China should use whatever works, whether modern or traditional, foreign or domestic, to improve China's status in the world.<sup>43</sup> Most China watchers today agree that Chinese pragmatic nationalism has been the dominant line of thinking among the Chinese people and their leaders since the 1980s.<sup>44</sup> The emergence of pragmatic nationalism in post-Mao China was in response to a legitimate crisis of the Communist regime starting in the late 1970s when the regime was troubled by a crisis of faith in socialism. It remains a highly effective instrument for the Communist regime. Led by the state, pragmatic nationalism identifies the nation closely with the Communist state. The key point for U.S. policymakers is that Chinese pragmatism differs greatly from Marxism or rigid Communist ideology with differing foreign policy implications.

From a foreign policy perspective, pragmatic nationalism sets peace and development as China's major strategic goals because economic prosperity is seen as the pathway for the Communist Party to stay in power and also as the foundation for China's rising nationalistic aspirations.<sup>45</sup> Political stability at home is emphasized as the necessary condition for the attainment of modernization. Pragmatic leaders, therefore, will do whatever it takes to avoid confrontation with the United States and other major powers that hold the key to China's modernization. While pragmatic leaders have evoked nationalism to rally support, they also had to make sure that nationalist sentiments would not jeopardize the twin pillars of the regime, political stability and economic modernization. PRC leaders

can not afford to have Chinese foreign policy dictated by emotional nationalistic rhetoric of the streets. Therefore, although pragmatic leaders on occasions have used nationalism to their advantage against perceived injustices by the West (the 1999 U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade and the 2001 collision between a U.S. Navy EP-3 surveillance plane and a Chinese fighter jet, for example), strong nationalistic rhetoric has always been followed by prudent actions in Chinese foreign affairs.<sup>46</sup>

### **China's Number One Priority: Economic Development and Modernization.**

The most fundamental strategic interest of China is to modernize. Since 1978, when Chinese leaders adopted a pragmatic approach to China's many political and socioeconomic problems and sharply reduced the role of ideology in economic policy, the results have been impressive. China has been the world's fastest growing economy for almost 3 decades, expanding at an average pace of almost 10 percent per annum, and is now the world's fourth largest economy as measured in dollars.<sup>47</sup> China's leaders regard the time between now and the year 2020 as a strategic opportunity to develop the economy and achieve "relatively well-off" (*xiaokang*) status.<sup>48</sup> Since the late 1970s, the Chinese government has reformed the economy from a Soviet-style centrally planned economy that was largely closed to international trade to a more market-oriented economy that has a rapidly growing private sector and is a major player in the global economy. In 2007 the United States imported \$312 billion in goods from China and exported \$61 billion in goods, making the United States China's largest export market (the United States also receives more imports from China than from any other country), and making China the third largest U.S. export market.<sup>49</sup>

China's strategic objective to modernize directly translates into China's key foreign policy objective of improving China's political, economic, and security standing in Asia and the world, so that it may continue to build relationships with states to enhance its image and influence to ensure the supply of strategically vital raw materials and the flow of Chinese exports.<sup>50</sup> China's foreign policy seeks to maintain open access to markets, enable the PRC to acquire needed technology, and avoid international conflict, especially with the United States. Chinese leaders recognize that continued rapid economic development and an improved capacity to generate new technologies will not only enhance the PRC's international stature but also raise concerns in other countries regarding China's capabilities and intentions. Therefore, Chinese leaders have taken deliberate steps to shape China's foreign policy around the goals of "peaceful development" and international engagement.<sup>51</sup>

### **Chinese Pragmatism: Embracing the World Community.**

Beijing has committed itself to a "peaceful development" (or "peaceful rise") that embraces economic globalization and the improvement of relations with the rest of the world. As it emerges as a great power, China knows that its continued development depends on world peace—a peace that China assures its development will, in turn, reinforce. China is also firmly resolved to discredit the "China threat" theory and to convince the international community, the United States in particular, that its economic

rise poses no threat. In 2005, the Chinese government issued a White Paper on “China’s Peaceful Development Road,” which stated that:

It is an inevitable choice based on its national conditions that China persists unwaveringly in taking the road of peaceful development. During the 100-odd years following the Opium War in 1840, China suffered humiliation and insult from big powers. And thus, ever since the advent of modern times, it has become the goal of the Chinese people to eliminate war, maintain peace, and build a country of independence and prosperity, and a comfortable and happy life for the people. Although it has made enormous achievements in development, China, with a large population, a weak economic foundation and unbalanced development, is still the largest developing country in the world. To stick to the road of peaceful development is the inevitable way for China to attain national prosperity and strength, and its people’s happiness. What the Chinese people need and cherish most is a peaceful international environment. They are willing to do their best to make energetic contributions for the common development of all countries.<sup>52</sup>

China’s approach to multilateralism has changed markedly since China became an active participant upon entry into the UN in 1971. It has now joined all the major intergovernmental organizations within the UN system and takes an active and positive approach in Asian regional economic, security, and political organizations. In institutions such as the Asian Development Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank, China has been a model citizen. China continues to play a key role hosting and facilitating the six-party talks on the North Korean nuclear issue. It has expanded its participation in UN peacekeeping efforts. Since 1990 the PLA has sent 11,063 military personnel to participate in 18 UN peacekeeping operations. Eight lost their lives on duty. As of the end of November 2008, China had 1,949 military peacekeeping personnel serving in nine UN mission areas and the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations.<sup>53</sup> Since 2000, China has sent 1,379 peacekeeping policemen to seven mission areas. As of November 2008, 208 Chinese peacekeeping policemen are serving in Liberia, Kosovo, Haiti, Sudan, and East Timor.<sup>54</sup> Although deeply apprehensive of resolutions condoning sanctions or interventions, the PRC has not sought to stop UN missions in the former Yugoslavia, Haiti, Somalia, or Iraq during the Gulf War and thereafter. Chinese leaders have broadly supported the U.S.-led war on terrorism that began after September 11, 2001, and have begun closer cooperation with U.S. and international counterterrorism agencies.

### **Ideology and Principles as Part of Chinese Strategic Culture.**

As noted, traditional Chinese thought, history, nationalism, economic rise, and more recently pragmatism in foreign affairs, all play a large role in China’s “peaceful development” philosophy. China is well known for taking a stand on principles in the world arena. By and large, these principles reflect the moral and idealistic elements in China’s foreign policy thinking and also drawn mainly from traditional Chinese thinking, which dreams of a world of universal harmony (*da tong shi jie*) and the humiliating experience of the “Century of Humiliation” that causes China to long for a fair and reasonable world order.

However, another major factor to consider is the legacy of Marxism-Leninism and Maoist thought, which advocates for a world free of exploitation by capitalism, imperialism, and colonialism—a world free of power politics, bloc politics, and hegemonism. Since the establishment of the PRC, Mao and his Communist Party successors have worked to ensure that China determined its own destiny. Every nation values its self-determination, but the Chinese cherish this principle with a passion that often seems to have faded in America and Western Europe. The Chinese understand sovereignty as a tangible thing; the lessons of the past continue to haunt them. As a result, PRC leaders over time have set forth the following principles: (1) The “five principles of peaceful coexistence” which include mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual nonaggression, mutual noninterference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful co-existence; (2) Establishing a fair and reasonable political and economic world order; (3) No use of force or threat of the use of force in international relations; (4) All nations, big or small, strong or weak, rich or poor, are equal in international affairs; and (5) China should always side with developing countries, and it should never seek hegemony or superpower status.<sup>55</sup> As stated in *China’s National Defense White Paper for 2008*:

China . . . will persist in pursuing the new security concept featuring mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and coordination, and advocating the settlement of international disputes and hotspot issues by peaceful means. It will encourage the advancement of security dialogues and cooperation with other countries, oppose the enlargement of military alliances, and acts of aggression and expansion. China will never seek hegemony or engage in military expansion now or in the future, no matter how developed it becomes.<sup>56</sup>

Despite these assurances, China’s use of military force outside its borders in the 20th century is often cited by the “China threat” theorists as examples of PRC’s aggressiveness and offensive nature. While the history of modern Chinese warfare provides several examples of cross-border offensive excursions, China’s leaders have claimed these cases of military preemption as strategically defensive acts. In *China and Strategic Culture*, Andrew Scobell describes a “Chinese Cult of Defense,” a combination of two dominant strands of Chinese strategic culture—a Confucius/Sun Tzu element and the other driven by Reapolitik.<sup>57</sup> Scobell asserts that while Chinese strategic culture is primarily pacifistic, defensive, and nonexpansionist, its leaders are nevertheless predisposed to deploy force when confronting threats to China’s core interests. When doing so, any war China fights would be seen as “just” and any military action defensive, even when it is offensive in nature. Indeed, Chinese strategic culture is heavily influenced by the notion of “righteous” or “just” war (*yizhan*).<sup>58</sup> It is a crucial element of China’s traditional approach to war; Confucius adopted the concept, and Mao later internalized it.<sup>59</sup> In addition, the strategic principle of “active defense” (*jiji fangyu*) is key to Chinese strategic thinkers.<sup>60</sup> While acknowledging Chinese military strategy is defensive, it allows for either a counterattack after being struck first, or a first-strike if necessary. Using the concept of “self-defense counter-attack” (*zizhi huanji*), China is more likely to engage in military preemption, prevention, or coercion if the use of force protects or advances vital interests, such as protection of its territory from external threats or to unify the country.<sup>61</sup> As previously discussed, China referred to its intervention in the Korean War as the “War to Resist

America and Aid Korea.” It was a “just” war, and also a counterattack, since in Beijing’s view the United States had made the first aggressive moves against China on the Korean Peninsula and in the Taiwan Strait. China’s border conflicts with India (1962), the Soviet Union (1969), and Vietnam (1979), are considered by the Chinese to be “self-defensive” and consistent with the notions of “active defense” and “just” war.<sup>62</sup> While these historical examples do not make effective arguments that China is a hegemonic or expansionist power, they do clearly caution that Chinese leaders will opt for force when they perceive its use as defensive in nature.

The main goal of Chinese foreign policy is to maintain a strong, independent, powerful, and united China that can pursue its number one priority—economic development. Chinese foreign policy maintains that, to achieve this goal, China must promote peaceful cooperation and a stable international environment.<sup>63</sup> Over time, economic imperatives have taken primacy over communist dogma and ideology. Indeed, Chinese leaders may be seen to adhere to the realist rather than the liberal school of international relations theory. In sharp contrast to the former Soviet Union and the United States, China has not been devoted to advancing any higher international ideological interest such as world communism or world democracy since the Cold War, that is, ideology has been secondary to advancing its national interest.<sup>64</sup>

### **Recommendations for U.S. National Security Policy.**

U.S. and Chinese national interests are fundamentally not in conflict. Beijing has always attached great importance to its relations with the United States. In the early 1990s, Deng Xiaoping issued a 16-character instruction to guide China’s policy toward the United States: Increase mutual trust (*zengjia xinren*), reduce trouble (*jianshao mafan*), enhance cooperation (*zengjia hezuo*), and not seek confrontation (*bugao duikang*).<sup>65</sup> With these guidelines, Beijing has been very successful in keeping a low profile and avoiding open confrontation with the United States since the Tiananmen Square crisis of 1989, with the exception of the Chinese embassy bombing and the EP-3 collision incident, events that were largely out of their control. At present, Sino-U.S. relations are at their most stable since Tiananmen. The prospects for continued stability are positive as long as neither nation infringes on the core security interests of the other. By instituting a policy of engagement in the world community, a pragmatic China has more areas of potential cooperation with the U.S. than ever before.

By having a contextual understanding of how strategic culture impacts and influences Chinese decisionmaking, U.S. policymakers can be in a better position to objectively evaluate the true *why* of a particular Chinese foreign policy, and what domestic factors may be behind it. With this understanding, U.S. leaders will be less likely to overreact, miscalculate, or otherwise misread any actions taken by China abroad. The following is an analysis of the implications of Chinese strategic culture with recommendations for U.S. national security policy:

1. Domestic factors play a role in shaping every country’s foreign policy but U.S. policymakers must understand the exceptionally large influence of strategic culture in PRC’s external behavior. Due to its defensive and peaceful philosophy and the lessons of history, Beijing is supersensitive to such issues as foreign intervention and interference,

hegemonism, regime legitimacy, territorial sovereignty, and national survival. China analysts and those involved in U.S. national security formulation must have a firm understanding of Chinese strategic culture, as it has a critical influence not only on *why* China uses force, but *where* and against *whom*. Strategic culture can also be used to understand how China perceives the strategic traditions of other states and uses these assumptions and beliefs to formulate threat assessments. By understanding Chinese strategic culture, it is possible to have a clearer picture of Chinese interpretations of U.S. strategic culture. Yet, all too often, the United States has a lack of understanding about the impact of history and culture on Chinese leadership perceptions. In the judgment of one Chinese strategic thinker: “almost all U.S. politicians (strategists) have no sense of history at all.”<sup>66</sup>

2. There exists a uniquely Chinese, essentially pacific strategic culture, rooted in the Confucian disparagement of the use of force. Historically, there has been little precedent to show China as an aggressive or expansionist power.<sup>67</sup> However, the “. . . Cult of Defense mentioned above reveals a cultural tendency in China to define just war and active defense in ways that actually predispose China to use force when it is rationalized as ‘defensive’ and ‘just’.” When faced with threats to its territorial sovereignty, Chinese leaders will use force quite readily. Because its military resources are limited, China will likely not seek resounding military victory but to send a warning or a message of deterrence or compellance.<sup>68</sup> U.S. strategists must understand that China is much more likely than other states to use force in territorial disputes, or for national unification, partly because of historical sensitivity to threats to China’s territorial integrity.

3. As such, the United States should always be aware of how its foreign policy impacts on China’s concerns for its security, and how a specific policy may be perceived as U.S. hegemonic power encroaching on China’s interests and sovereignty. Any change in the size or commitment of the U.S. military presence in Northeast Asia must be carefully considered and the rationale articulated clearly, as any change may be easily misread by Chinese leaders. Changes in land power strength must be considered very carefully, as American “boots on the ground” in Northeast Asia would be viewed by the Chinese as an important indicator of the level of U.S. defense commitment. Of course, any U.S. military presence along China’s immediate borders will be viewed with alarm and suspicion.

4. China’s leaders consider national unification as a sacred trust and the reunification of Taiwan a top strategic objective. Taiwan is not the sole cause of U.S.-China tensions, but it is clearly the most serious single point of contention, and the only issue over which one can foresee a Sino-American military conflict.<sup>69</sup> China sees its own actions as justifiably self-defensive, but these same actions appear aggressive to the U.S. and other countries. Beijing views itself as trying to preserve the status quo and Chinese national territory (both understood as including Taiwan as part of China) against periodic threats of Taiwanese separatism and U.S. intervention to prevent unification.<sup>70</sup> America’s continued support for Taipei is seen as a means of obstructing the PRC from regaining their rightful territory and a conscious effort to suppress China’s maturation into a major power. With Beijing’s suspicions concerning U.S. intentions, and Chinese emotions perpetually high concerning territorial integrity, any change in the U.S. policy of “strategic ambiguity” in regards to Taiwan must be weighed very carefully.<sup>71</sup> Taiwan will remain a difficult

and ongoing challenge in U.S.-China relations, prone to either sparking a downturn in bilateral relations or becoming more dangerous as a reflection of an overall deterioration in Sino-U.S. relations.<sup>72</sup>

5. With memories of Japanese invasion, occupation, and years of atrocities, China remains suspicious of Japan's "aggressive Japanese 'national character'" and are watchful for any sign of a revival of militarism and ultra-nationalism.<sup>73</sup> Any changes in U.S.-Japanese defense ties will be closely studied by Chinese leaders, who will likely see any change as a sign of a closer military alliance between the two countries and a subsequent threat to China's security. Any drawdown of U.S. forces in the area (such as from South Korea) that results in a buildup of the Japanese Self-Defense Force and its capabilities will most assuredly initiate a new arms race or at the least destabilize the region. Prior to making changes in the U.S.-Japan defense relationship, U.S. policymakers will need to assess very carefully how such changes may be interpreted by China.

6. The PRC has shifted from being a revolutionary power to becoming a member of the world nation-state system. The new model is a move from revolution to modernization, rigidity to flexibility, dogmatic to the pragmatic. Nationalism, patriotism and the drive to modernize China will likely ensure a continued pragmatic approach to international relations. The United States often makes liberal democratic ideology a priority in international affairs. When dealing with China, the United States should refrain from using ideology as leverage. Instead, the United States should continue to coax the Chinese leadership into pragmatic engagement, and convince Chinese leaders that it has no intention of hindering China's economic development, impairing its national cohesion, and thwarting its attempts to achieve great-power status.

7. As China's pragmatic nationalism continues to push China towards modernization, China will likely enlarge the degree and range of its participation in international activities and its pursuit of economic modernization and regional stability. This will lead China toward greater cooperation on security matters and increasing economic and cultural exchanges. The United States should continue its policy of "constructive engagement" to further integrate China into the international community. Wherever possible, the United States should elicit China's participation in bilateral and multilateral programs; working closely together will bring a better understanding of each other's cultures.

8. Modernization is China's number one strategic priority, and thus the United States should expect China to pursue all aspects—political, military, and economic—to make this possible. This may entail multilateral, regional, or unilateral partnerships or agreements, perhaps with states that the United States does not recognize or condone, but from whom China requires resources and needed raw materials to sustain its economic development. For example, increased Chinese "influence" on the African continent has raised alarms with some in the United States, but America's leaders should understand and appreciate the economic and domestic reasons for China's involvement in Africa. Currently, 25 percent of China's oil comes from the continent.<sup>74</sup> China has trade relations with 49 African countries and bilateral trade agreements with the majority of them.<sup>75</sup> While the U.S. position is that China's relationship with states such as Angola, Sudan, and Zimbabwe have enabled these countries to ignore international pressure to isolate or reform them, it is understandable why China pursues its policies in the region so

as to sustain its economic growth. The United States should deal with China with this basic understanding, yet continue to work with China on common ground beneficial to Africans and to further encourage China's responsible international behavior.

9. With China's history of invasion and intervention by foreign powers and resulting concerns for its territorial integrity and national defense, U.S. policymakers should not view modernization efforts with the PLA, Navy, and Air Force as a potential threat to U.S. security. When comparing China's military spending as a percentage of its gross domestic product (GDP), China's military spending is moderate and not out of the ordinary.<sup>76</sup> China's military modernization has been largely defensive in nature. China's Navy, which receives much attention by the "China threat" adherents, currently has limited range and capabilities to act in offensive operations; has no aircraft carrier or meaningful force projection capability; and lacks the command, control, computer, and communications (C4I) necessary in modern warfare.<sup>77</sup> It is also uncertain whether China can carry out large joint operations with its land and air forces.<sup>78</sup> The modernization of China's military is an attempt to fix some of these shortfalls and should be expected of any growing regional economic and political power. Nor do they pose an immediate threat to U.S. interests in the Pacific region as it remains defense-oriented, except for the case of Taiwan (see Recommendation 4). It is also worth noting that despite the fact that the United States has maintained extensive nuclear strike plans against Chinese targets for more than half a century, China has never responded by building large nuclear forces of its own and is unlikely to do so in the future.<sup>79</sup>

10. The United States should work hard to resume security cooperation and military-to-military programs with China, which were suspended in October 2008 after the United States announced a planned 6.5 billion dollar arms sale to Taiwan (such sales are a persistent source of U.S.-China tension). Because of the possibility of armed conflict over Taiwan, the United States needs to maintain an effective military-to-military relationship with China, focusing less on security cooperation and more on security management in which dialogue, information gathering, and limited cooperation take place to minimize misperceptions and the chances for conflict.<sup>80</sup> The U.S. military and the PLA, as a minimum, should conduct regular high-level talks. These talks could be meetings involving the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense, and Under Secretaries or Assistant Secretaries of Defense. Members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other general and flag-grade officers from the military services should be included. Topics of discussion could include the strategic intentions of each country and the policies and concerns of the respective countries towards specific topics, such as Taiwan, proliferation, North Korea, and the War on Terror.<sup>81</sup> At the working level, military-to-military relations will provide opportunities for members of the two armed forces to learn more about each other firsthand, and cultural stereotypes would be dispelled.

11. It is critically important to continuously monitor Chinese strategic thinking and perceptions of the United States, Japan, and Taiwan. It is essential that the United States keeps abreast of Chinese strategic political and military thought, which can provide key insights and indications of possible future courses of action. The U.S. national security and defense communities need to grow a cadre of Chinese linguists and area experts that can translate and analyze the increasing number of publications from the official departments in the CCP and PLA, as well as those generated in Chinese intellectual circles.

The National Media Exploitation Center (NMEC) and its translation capabilities should be fully resourced and brought to bear to provide Pentagon and Defense Intelligence Agency China analysts greater access to translated information from all media sources.<sup>82</sup> Finally, foreign area and intelligence professionals with the requisite language and cultural understanding need to be groomed to serve in all branches of the government that have interaction with Chinese counterparts, such as military attachés, State Department foreign service officers, treasury and law enforcement officers, and custom officials, to name a few.

## **Conclusion.**

The U.S.-China relationship is too big to disregard and too critical to misread. To craft any intelligent, effective policy towards China, the U.S. national security community must have a clear contextual understanding of the historical and cultural factors that define China's strategic thinking, and that can best provide an impassionate assessment of China's goals and intentions that may impact U.S. national interests. The "China threat" thesis is as dangerous as it is misleading. Unfounded and uninformed rhetoric by policymakers in Washington could force China to militarize its intentions, even if they were benign, which could lead to enhancing the tensions and making the "China threat" a self-fulfilling prophecy. By implementing an institutional thought process that appreciates the impact of culture on policy and strategy, U.S. policymakers will be in a much better position to understand the actions and intent of the Chinese leadership to formulate an appropriate and reasonable U.S. response. Deng Xiaoping once pointed out that "Sino-American relations must be made good."<sup>83</sup> Perhaps, with a better understanding of each other's strategic culture, the United States, the strongest developed country in the world, and China, the most populated country in the world, can learn to respect and understand each other.

## **ENDNOTES**

1. Chinese Vice President Hu Jintao, speech at the Asian Strategy and Leadership Institute, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, April 24, 2002.
2. Rex Li, "Security Challenge of an Ascendant China," Suisheng Zhao, ed., *Chinese Foreign Policy: Pragmatism and Strategic Behavior*, Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2004, p. 23.
3. Khalid R. Al-Rodhan, "A Critique of the China Threat Theory: A Systematic Analysis," *Asian Perspective*, Vol. 31, No. 3, 2007, p. 42.
4. Bill Gertz, *The China Threat: How the People's Republic Targets America*, Washington, DC: Regnery, 2000, p. 199. Gertz further stated that:

This grave strategic threat [China] includes the disruption of vital U.S. interests in the Pacific region and even the possibility of a nuclear war that could cost millions of American lives. China's hard-eyed communist rulers have set out on a coolly pragmatic course of strategic deception that masks their true goals: undermining the U.S. around the world and raising China to a position of dominant international political and military power.

5. "A Public Opinion Survey of Canadians and Americans about China," Ipsos-Reid Report, prepared for the Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars and Canada Institute on North American Issues, Washington, DC, June 2005, p. 1.
6. U.S. Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, February 6, 2006, p. 29.
7. U.S. Department of Defense, *Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2008, Annual Report to Congress*, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2008, p. I.
8. Robert M. Gates, Submitted Statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee, January 27, 2009, U.S. Department of Defense, [www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1337](http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1337), accessed February 2, 2009.
9. *About.com*, "Chinese History in Brief," *chineseculture.about.com*, accessed December 28, 2008.
10. Ying Fan, *A Classification of Chinese Culture*, London, UK: Lincoln School of Management, 2000, p. 6.
11. *Ibid.*
12. Huiyun Feng, *Chinese Strategic Culture and Foreign Policy Decisionmaking: Confucianism, Leadership and War*, New York: Routledge, 2007, p. 21.
13. Alastair Iain Johnston, *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995, p. 98. Full translation: "To fight and win one hundred battles is not the supreme skill, but to subdue the enemy without fighting is."
14. Andrew Scobell, *China and Strategic Culture*, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, May 2002, p. 6.
15. *Ibid.*
16. *China's National Defense White Paper for 2006*, Beijing, China: Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, December 29, 2006, Preface.
17. Feng, pp. 2, 7.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 30. For example, Feng concludes that the constructivist cultural realist argument by noted China researcher Alastair Iain Johnston fails in its insistence on the exclusive impact of a parabellum strategic culture of offensive realism in Chinese grand strategy, which results in the wrong prediction that Chinese leaders under this strategic culture are all offensive in nature. See Johnston, *Cultural Realism*, for his argument that Chinese strategic culture exhibits an aggressive and expansionist preference.
19. Suisheng Zhao, *A Nation-State by Construction: Dynamics of Modern Chinese Nationalism*, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004, p. 17.
20. Deng Yong, "Escaping the Periphery: China's National Identity in World Politics," Weixing Hu et al., eds., *China's International Relations in the Twenty-first Century*, Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2000, p. 46.
21. Kenneth G. Clark, "The Boxer Uprising 1899-1900," The Russo-Japanese War Research Society, [www.russojapanesewar.com/boxers.html](http://www.russojapanesewar.com/boxers.html), accessed January 2, 2009.

22. Richard O'Connor, *The Spirit Soldiers: A Historical Narrative of the Boxer Rebellion*, New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1973, p. 293.

23. R. J. Rummel, *China's Bloody Century: Genocide and Mass Murder Since 1900*, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1991, p. 50. While no official estimates are available for those killed in the sacking of Peking and the neighboring areas by the victorious contingents of foreign troops, Rummel's research provides a minimum estimate of 2,000 Chinese killed to a high of 25,000; perhaps the best figure is 5,000 murdered.

24. Clark. China was fined war reparations of 450,000,000 Haikwan tael of fine silver, or approximately U.S.\$6.653 billion today. Russia received 30 percent of the reparation, Germany 20 percent, France 15.75 percent, Britain 11.24 percent, Japan 7.7 percent, and the United States 7 percent. This large indemnity obstructed the economic growth of China as large amounts of money flowed out of China to foreign powers. The sum total that China had to pay over the next 39 years with the added interest of 4 percent was over 900,000,000 taels.

25. Zhao, p. 87.

26. *Ibid.*, p. 88. When Wilson's Fourteen Points proved to be empty words, many Chinese intellectuals lost faith in the United States and Western powers, and along with them the values of capitalism and democracy. Some historians have speculated that history may have taken a different course if the United States had taken a stronger position on Wilson's Fourteen Points and self-determination. However, the United States did not do so, and, as a result, China turned to Marxism and Leninism as tools to potentially resolve many of the nation's issues.

27. Mark Eykholt, "Aggression, Victimization, and Chinese Historiography of the Nanjing Massacre," in *The Nanjing Massacre in History and in Historiography*, Joshua A. Fogel, ed., Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000, p. 46-48. The final Nanking death toll would never be known, and the extent of the atrocities is debated between China and Japan, with numbers ranging from Japanese estimates of several thousand to upwards of 200,000, to the Chinese claim of a noncombatant death toll of 300,000. A prudent estimate is thus 200,000 Chinese murdered by the Japanese.

28. Rummel, pp. 149-150. Casualty figures of the war vary greatly, depending on Chinese or Japanese sources. Rummel's research is arguably the most detailed, thorough, and accurate on this subject. The Japanese committed hundreds of atrocities and incidents of mass murder against the Chinese, including their merciless slaughter of captured Chinese soldiers, savage bombing of Chinese cities, the "Loot All, Burn All, Kill All" campaign, and germ warfare. In total, over the 9 years that Japan fought in China and occupied large portions of the country, from 1,578,000 to 6,325,000 Chinese likely were killed in cold blood by the Japanese; Rummel believes a prudent estimate is 3,949,000. Taken together with military deaths, 3,832,000; civilian war-deaths, 3,252,000; famine, 2,250,000; and genocide by the KMT and Communists, a staggering 19,440,000 Chinese died during the war.

29. Liu Ji, "Making the Right Choices in Twenty-First Century Sino-American Relations," Suisheng Zhao, ed., *Chinese Foreign Policy*, p. 245. See also Jie Chen, *Ideology in U.S. Foreign Policy: Case Studies in U.S. China Policy*, Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1992, p. 23, noting one such overture to the United States in May 1949 from Mao's lieutenant, Zhou Enlai, who urged closer ties with Washington, suggesting U.S. recognition of the forthcoming government, expressed some disaffection with the Soviet Union, and requested U.S. foreign aid. Truman killed the opportunity by instructing the State Department "to be careful not to indicate any softening towards the communists."

30. Jie Chen, *Ideology in U.S. Foreign Policy*, p. 10. By 1949, U.S. foreign policy was decidedly driven by anti-communist, liberal-democratic ideals. Although U.S. leaders knew Chiang Kai-Shek was a "corrupt" dictator and President Truman called Chiang a "bad horse," the United States still backed the bad horse almost to the very end of the Nationalist regime on mainland China. It seemed that Chiang was the only

choice to accommodate both the strong post-war anticommunist mood and the undesirable situation in China's politics.

31. *Ibid.*, p. 26. Historians debate whether Truman's decision not to recognize the new government of China marked a historic "lost chance" to begin rapprochement with Mao and the CCP. One thing is clear—it was only after the Mao and Zhou overtures to the United States were rebuffed in May-June 1949 that Mao declared in July 1949 that China would "lean to one side," or align itself more closely with the Soviet Union. At the time, joining the communist bloc was the only pragmatic choice due to China's urgent need for economic assistance and diplomatic recognition.

32. Liu Ji, p. 246.

33. Andrew Scobell, "Soldiers, Statesmen, Strategic Culture, and China's 1950 Intervention in Korea," Suisheng Zhao, ed., *Chinese Foreign Policy*, p. 110. Scobell cites that although Mao Zedong had reached a decision in August 1950 that, in principle, China would probably have to intervene in the war, he wavered on the actual decision until virtually the last minute. Mao did not issue the formal order until October 8, 1950, the day after the UN forces crossed the 38th parallel.

34. *Ibid.*, p. 113. This fear was summed up in General Peng Dehuai's opinion to Mao:

If we allow the enemy [the United States] to occupy the entire Korean peninsula, the threat to our country is very great. In the past when the Japanese invaded China they used Korea as a springboard. First they attacked our three eastern provinces, then using these as a springboard, they launched a large scale offensive against the interior. We cannot overlook this lesson of history. We must fight the enemy now, we cannot hesitate.

35. Joseph C. Goulden, *Korea: The Untold Story of the War*, New York, NY: Times Books, 1982, p. 282.

36. "Korean War Frequently Asked Questions," *CenturyChina.com*, [centurychina.com/history/krwarfaq.html](http://centurychina.com/history/krwarfaq.html), accessed January 10, 2009.

37. Donald Knox, *The Korean War: Uncertain Victory – The Concluding Volume of an Oral History*, New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1988, p. 507. Without a doubt, the Korean War led to a great delay in the process of Chinese modernization. During the war, the CPV consumed about 5.6 million tons of war materials. The young People's Republic spent 6.2 billion yuan it could hardly afford on the intervention, forgoing much expenditure on economic development and social remedies.

38. "Korean War Frequently Asked Questions." U.S. casualty counts for the CPA were based on arbitrary estimates which were greatly inflated. Some sources quote Pentagon estimates of Chinese casualties at 900,000 or more. However, for the PLA, it was serious misconduct to report false casualty numbers on either side, since such false reports would result in wrong calculations by the nation's leaders. Thus, the best count from official Chinese sources is the CPA casualty count of 390,000. It breaks down to 110,400 KIA; 21,600 dead from wounds; 13,000 dead from sickness; 25,600 captured and missing; and 260,000 wounded.

39. Peter H. Gries, *China's New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy*, Berkely: University of California Press, 2004, p. 45.

40. Thomas Kane, "China's Foundations: Guiding Principles of Chinese Foreign Policy," Guoli Liu, ed., *Chinese Foreign Policy in Transition*, New York: Aldine De Gruyter, 2004, p. 102.

41. Suisheng Zhao, "China's Pragmatic Nationalism: Is it Manageable?" *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 29, Winter 2005-06, p. 132.

42. Suisheng Zhao, "Chinese Nationalism and Pragmatic Foreign Policy Behavior," Suisheng Zhao, ed., *Chinese Foreign Policy*, p. 70.

43. *Ibid.*, p. 71. This is illustrated by Deng Xiaoping's famous saying that "It does not matter if it is a black or white cat as long as it can catch rats."

44. *Ibid.*, p. 75.

45. Suisheng Zhao, Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver, "Chinese Pragmatic Nationalism and its Foreign Policy Implications," speech delivered at the 2008 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, August 28-31, 2008, p. 3.

46. *Ibid.*

47. C. Fred Bergsten, *China: The Balance Sheet – What the World Needs to Know about the Emerging Superpower*, Center for Strategic and International Studies, and the Peter G. Peterson Institute for International Economics, New York: Public Affairs, 2006, p. 18.

48. Kenneth Lieberthal, "How Domestic Forces Shape the PRC's Grand Strategy and International Impact," Ashley J. Tellis and Michael Wills, eds., *Domestic Political Change and Grand Strategy*, Strategic Asia 2007-08, Washington, DC: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2007, p. 30.

49. David J. Kay, "Engaging the 'New China,'" *National Security Watch*, Institute of Land Warfare, Association of the United States Army, September 2, 2008, p. 9.

50. *Ibid.*, p. 6.

51. Lieberthal, p. 30.

52. "China's White Paper on Peaceful Development Road," Section I, PRC State Council Information Office, December 22, 2005, *China People's Daily Online*, [english.peopledaily.com.cn/200512/22/eng20051222\\_230059.html](http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200512/22/eng20051222_230059.html), accessed January 10, 2009.

53. *China's National Defense White Paper for 2008*, Beijing, China: Information Office of the State Council of the PRC, January 2009, p. Section XIII, International Security Cooperation.

54. *Ibid.*

55. Wu Xinbo, "Four Contradictions Constraining China's Foreign Policy Behavior," Suisheng Zhao, ed., *Chinese Foreign Policy*, p. 61. The Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence were first put forth by Premier Zhou Enlai at the start of negotiations that took place in Beijing from December 1953 to April 1954 between the Chinese and Indian governments on the relations between the two countries with respect to Tibet.

56. *China's National Defense White Paper for 2008*, Section I, The Security Situation.

57. Scobell, *China and Strategic Culture*, p. 4. Scobell argues that China's strategic disposition cannot accurately be characterized as either pacifist or bellicose. Rather, China has a dualistic strategic culture. The two main strands are a Confucian-Mencian one that is conflict averse and defensive minded; and a Realpolitik one which favors military solutions and is offensive oriented. Both strands are operative and both influence and combine in dialectic fashion to form a "Chinese Cult of Defense." This cult paradoxically tends to dispose Chinese leaders to pursue offensive military operations as a primary alternative in pursuit of national goals, while rationalizing these actions as being purely defensive and last resort.

58. Johnston, p. 69. Johnston points out how the concept of righteous war dates back thousands of years and pervades the Chinese *Seven Military Classics* as well as other classics on statecraft.

59. Scobell, *China and Strategic Culture*, p. 10. Scobell illustrates that Chinese leaders see just wars as those fought by oppressed groups against oppressors; unjust wars are ones waged by oppressors against the oppressed. In contemporary Chinese thinking, China long has been a weak, oppressed country fighting against powerful imperialist oppressors. Thus for many Chinese, any war fought by their country is by definition a just conflict—even a war in which China strikes first. This might include any war fought to restore or protect national territory or to maintain national prestige.

60. *Ibid.*, p. 12. Scobell quotes Deng Xiaoping: “Active defense is not defense per se, but includes defensive offensives. Active defense includes our going out, so that if we are attacked, we will certainly counter attack.”

61. U.S. Department of Defense, *Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2008*, p. 17.

62. For example, China’s largest military conflict in the post-Mao era was its attack against Vietnam in February 1979. The PRC launched the offensive in response to Vietnam’s invasion and occupation of Cambodia, which ended the reign of the PRC-backed Khmer Rouge, Vietnamese raids in Chinese territory near the border, and supposed mistreatment of Vietnam’s ethnic Chinese minority. Although it was China that invaded Vietnam, Beijing officially termed the war a “defensive counterattack” designed to “teach a lesson.” After China declared its punitive mission a success, PRC forces withdrew without forcing the Vietnamese out of Cambodia. The 29-day incursion cost China 60,000 KIA and 15,000 WIA (Chinese figures).

63. “Beijing Likens Cheney Criticism to Nosy Neighbor,” *The Washington Times*, March 2, 2007, [www.washingtontimes.com/news/2007/mar/01/20070301-104826-2978r/](http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2007/mar/01/20070301-104826-2978r/), accessed February 15, 2009. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Qin Gang reiterated China’s diplomatic philosophy with eight points: China will not seek hegemony; China will not play power politics, interfere in other countries’ internal affairs, or impose its ideology on other countries; all countries should be treated equally; China will have no double standards in its international affairs; China advocates all countries handle their relations on the basis of the United Nations charter and norms governing international relations; China commits to peaceful negotiation and consultation to solve its international disputes; China is firmly opposed to terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and China respects the ethnic diversity of the world.

64. The PRC made some provocative calls for the spread of communism and world revolution in the 1960’s, but at the end of the Cold War, Chinese leaders, namely Deng Xiaoping, made it clear that China had no interest to carry on the Soviet/Communist ideology, nor seek to export it.

65. Quansheng Zhao, “Chinese Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era,” Guoli Liu, ed., *Chinese Foreign Policy in Transition*, p. 315.

66. Scobell, *China and Strategic Culture*, p. 20.

67. Feng, p. 26. Feng’s review of Chinese history indicates that in over 2,000 years of feudal rule the feudal empires of China seldom displayed aggressive intentions towards other countries nor made any attempts at expansion despite the capability to do so. According to Feng, in China’s 5,000 years of history, there were only two large-scale military expansionist movements carried out by the nomadic minorities of Mongolian and Manchurian people. China’s twentieth-century wars have been “self-defensive,” “righteous” wars waged to protect its borders, territory and people, or to unify the country.

68. Scobell, *China and Strategic Culture*, p. 22.

69. Dennis Roy, *Taiwan Strait Update: Crisis Deferred*, Honolulu, HI: U.S. Department of Defense Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, February 2006, p. 6.

70. *Ibid.*, p. 7.

71. The current U.S. policy towards China and Taiwan is characterized as “strategic ambiguity.” Effectively, this means that “if Taiwan declares independence, don’t count on us; if the PRC invades Taiwan, don’t count us out.” Strategic ambiguity is a strategy of dual deterrence, and depends on the fact that neither Taiwan nor China can predict U.S. reaction to a disruption of the unstable status quo. While the United States has agreed to a one-China principle, it does not affirm the PRC contention that Taiwan belongs to the PRC. Thus, the United States carefully acknowledges, but does not necessarily affirm, the Chinese position that there is one China and Taiwan belongs to China.

72. Roy, p. 2.

73. Scobell, *China and Strategic Culture*, p. 16.

74. Phillippe D. Rogers, “Dragon With a Heart of Darkness? – Countering Chinese Influence in Africa,” *Joint Force Quarterly*, No. 47, 4th Quarter 2007, p. 23.

75. *Ibid.*, p. 24.

76. Al-Rodhan, p. 49. The World Bank’s World Development Indicators Database compared China’s military spending as a percentage of its GDP to six other nations – Russia, United States, United Kingdom, South Korea, France, China, and Japan. From 2000 to 2006, China’s defense expenditures were nearly 2 percent of its GDP; only Japan spent less than China as a percentage of its GDP.

77. *Ibid.*, p. 51.

78. *Ibid.*

79. *Ibid.*, p. 53.

80. Kevin Pollpeter, *U.S.-China Security Management: Assessing the Military-to-Military Relationship*, RAND report prepared for the U.S. Air Force, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2004, p. 91. Pollpeter points out that in security cooperation, militaries work together to promote common security against potential enemies. The goal of security management, in contrast, is to protect national security by reducing the chances of armed conflict between two countries, ensuring victory in case armed conflict does occur, and cooperating when appropriate against third-party threats, such as terrorism. Thus, the reasons for carrying out military-to-military activities with China will be different from those that are carried out with friends and allies.

81. *Ibid.*, p. 93.

82. The National Media Exploitation Center (NMEC) was established in late 2001 to coordinate DIA, CIA, FBI, and NSA efforts to analyze and disseminate information gleaned from paper documents, electronic media, videotapes, audiotapes and electronic equipment seized by the U.S. military and Intelligence Community (IC) in Afghanistan and later Iraq and other foreign areas. DIA is the Director of National Intelligence executive agent for the NMEC, which now carries out the IC’s worldwide Document and Media Exploitation (DOMEX) mission.

83. Liu Ji, p. 248.